Organon F
Volume 27, November 2020, Issue 4, Pages 437–445
ISSN 2585-7150 (online) ISSN 1335-0668 (print)
Research Article
Laudan, Intuition and Normative Naturalism
Howard Sankey
https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27402
The aim of this paper is to document Laudan’s rejection of the appeal to intuition in the context of his development of normative naturalism. At one point in the development of his methodological thinking, Laudan appealed to pre-analytic intuitions, which might be employed to identify episodes in the history of science against which theories of scientific methodology are to be tested. However, Laudan came to reject this appeal to intuitions, and rejected this entire approach to the evaluation of a theory of method. This is an important stage in the development of his normative naturalist meta-methodology.
Epistemic normativity; meta-methodology; method; theory-change.
Author
Howard Sankey
Affiliation
University of Melbourne
Address
School of Historical and Philosophical Studies, University of Melbourne, Parkville, Victoria, Australia 3010
Received
6 February 2020
Accepted
3 June 2020
Published online
16 June 2020
Publishers
Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences
Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Sciences
APA
Sankey, H. (2020). Laudan, Intuition and Normative Naturalism. Organon F, 27(4), 437–445. https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27402
Chicago
Sankey, Howard. 2020. "Laudan, Intuition and Normative Naturalism." Organon F 27 (4): 437–445. https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27402
Harvard
Sankey, H. (2020). Laudan, Intuition and Normative Naturalism. Organon F, 27(4), pp. 437–445. https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27402
© Howard Sankey
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