Organon F

Volume 33, August 2026, Issue 3, Pages 281–317

ISSN 2585-7150 (online)

Research Article

Modal Essentialism, Possible Worlds and the Problem of De Re Representation

Karol Lenart

https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2026.33303

Abstract

Modal essentialism holds that some x is essentially F if and only if at every possible world at which x exists, x is F. This view entails (ignoring the case of extreme essentialism) that distinct possible worlds can represent de re (singular) possibilities for the same individual. In the literature we find haecceitist and anti-haecceitist explanations of de re representation. The aim of this paper is to analyse which explanations of de re representation are consistent with genuine (nontrivial, objective) and plausible variants of modal essentialism. As I demonstrate, only moderate haecceitism meets this criterion. However, its weakness lies in its inability to account for intuitions about the variability of our modal judgments. In contrast, extreme haecceitism and moderate anti-haecceitism (modelled on qualitative counterpart theory) have the advantage of accommodating both essentialist and variability intuitions, provided both views are supplemented with a notion of quasi-essentiality.

Keywords

De re modality; essence and essentialism; modal representation; haecceitism; possible worlds; transworld identity.

Author(s) and affiliation(s)

Author

Karol Lenart

Affiliation

University of Warsaw

Address

Department of Philosophy, University of Warsaw, ul. Krakowskie Przedmieście 26/28, 00-325 Warsaw, Poland

E-mail

kz.lenart@uw.edu.pl 

About this article

Received

26 February 2025

Accepted

23 January 2026

Publishers

Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences

Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Sciences

Cite as

APA

Lenart, K. (2026). Modal Essentialism, Possible Worlds and the Problem of De Re Representation. Organon F33(3), 281–317. https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2026.33303

Chicago

Lenart, Karol. 2026. "Modal Essentialism, Possible Worlds and the Problem of De Re Representation." Organon F 33 (3): 281–317. https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2026.33303

Harvard

Lenart, K. (2026). Modal Essentialism, Possible Worlds and the Problem of De Re Representation. Organon F, 33(3), pp. 281–317. https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2026.33303

Copyright information

© Karol Lenart

Response page

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This article is distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International Public License (CC BY-NC 4.0).


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