Organon F

Volume 32, August 2025, Issue 3, Pages 323–347

ISSN 2585-7150 (online)

On Brunero’s non-normative disjunctivism, agents exhibiting means-ends incoherence are irrational because they are guaranteed to have at least one attitude that fails to achieve its constitutive aim, and such an aim failure is not a failure of reason. This paper primarily aims to show that this account fails to adequately explain the irrationality of means-ends incoherence. More specifically, I argue that agents exhibiting this incoherence can be justifiably criticized for irrationality, and they cannot ward off such criticism by claiming that there is no reason to be means-ends coherent. Furthermore, I argue that Brunero’s three objections to the strong normativity of means-ends coherence are not successful.

Means-ends incoherence; means-ends reasoning; constitutivism; non-normative disjunctivism; Brunero.

Author

Byeong D. Lee

Affiliation

Sungkyunkwan University

Address

Department of Philosophy, Sungkyunkwan University, 25-2, Sungkyunkwan-ro, Jongno-gu, Seoul, Republic of Korea

E-mail

bydlee@skku.edu

Received

26 June 2024

Accepted

6 April 2025

Publishers

Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences

Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Sciences

APA

Lee, B. D. (2025). Brunero’s Non-Normative Disjunctivism and Means-Ends Reasoning. Organon F, 32(3), 323–347. https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2025.32303

Chicago

Lee, Byeong D. 2025. "Brunero’s Non-Normative Disjunctivism and Means-Ends Reasoning." Organon F 32 (3): 323–347. https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2025.32303

Harvard

Lee, B. D. (2025). Brunero’s Non-Normative Disjunctivism and Means-Ends Reasoning. Organon F, 32(3), pp. 323–347. https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2025.32303

© Byeong D. Lee

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