Organon F
Volume 32, August 2025, Issue 3, Pages 300–322
ISSN 2585-7150 (online)
Research Article
Scientific Realism/Anti-Realism Debate: Roy Bhaskar’s Position
Maryam Poostforush – Mostafa Taqavi
The debate between scientific realism and anti-realism has long revolved around scientific theories. Realists contend that scientific theories are true or approximately true. In contrast, anti-realists posit that scientific theories are shaped as mere instruments that help to predict and categorize observable phenomena. As such, anti-realists find no truth value in scientific theories and only accept their empirical adequacy. Roy Bhaskar, as a critical realist, believes in the existence of the unobservable entities and considers them knowable. Furthermore, because he considers knowledge fallible, he maintains that theories arising from social activities may or may not be true. The purpose of this article is to clarify the position that Bhaskar takes in the debate between scientific realism and anti-realism. Before addressing this central purpose, the article first tries to find out whether Bhaskar is indeed a realist in three metaphysical, epistemic and semantic dimensions. The study argues that his alternative position on the truth/falsity of theories would detach him from the anti-realist camp, and he is not an anti-realist in terms of any of the three dimensions mentioned above. Of course, Bhaskar draws what could be called a “delicate border” between his realist approach and that of realists who attribute the approximate truth of a theory to its success.
Scientific realism; anti-realism; Roy Bhaskar; theory; truth; experiment.
Author
Maryam Poostforush
Affiliation
Sharif University of Technology
Address
Department of Philosophy of Science, Sharif University of Technology, Azadi Stree, Tehran, P.C.: 1458889694, Iran
Author
Mostafa Taqavi (corresponding author)
Affiliation
Sharif University of Technology
Address
Department of Philosophy of Science, Sharif University of Technology, Azadi Stree, Tehran, P.C.: 1458889694, Iran
Received
11 June 2024
Revised
31 March 2025
Accepted
6 April 2025
Publishers
Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences
Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Sciences
APA
Poostforush, M., Taqavi, M. (2025). Scientific Realism/Anti-Realism Debate: Roy Bhaskar’s Position. Organon F, 32(3), 300–322. https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2025.32302
Chicago
Poostforush, Maryam – Taqavi, Mostafa. 2025. "Scientific Realism/Anti-Realism Debate: Roy Bhaskar’s Position." Organon F 32 (3): 300–322. https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2025.32302
Harvard
Poostforush, M., Taqavi, M. (2025). Scientific Realism/Anti-Realism Debate: Roy Bhaskar’s Position. Organon F, 32(3), pp. 300–322. https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2025.32302
© Maryam Poostforush – Mostafa Taqavi
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