Organon F

Volume 32, May 2025, Issue 2, Pages 193–223

ISSN 2585-7150 (online)

If Explanationism is true, then, for any fact and any person, the fact’s explaining why they believe it is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for their knowing it. In this paper I question the sufficiency of the condition and argue against its necessity.

Knowledge; belief; explanation; Gettier; skepticism; deduction.

Author

Nathan William Davies

Address

Kenilworth, United Kingdom

E-mail

nwd.correspondence@gmail.com 

Received

13 June 2024

Revised

22 February 2025

Accepted

8 March 2025

Publishers

Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences

Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Sciences

APA

Davies, N.W. (2025). Consequences of Explanationism. Organon F, 32(2), 193–223. https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2025.32204

Chicago

Davies, Nathan William. 2025. "Consequences of Explanationism." Organon F 32 (2): 193–223. https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2025.32204

Harvard

Davies, N.W. (2025). Consequences of Explanationism. Organon F, 32(2), pp. 193–223. https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2025.32204

© Nathan William Davies

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