Organon F
Volume 31, May 2024, Issue 2, Pages 95–113
ISSN 2585-7150 (online) ISSN 1335-0668 (print)
Research Article
An Epistemic-Practical Dilemma for Evidentialism
Byeong D. Lee
There are cases in which epistemic rationality seems to conflict with practical rationality. Evidentialists such as Parfit, Shah, Skorupski and Way deny that there are practical reasons for belief. On their view, the only genuine normative reasons for belief are epistemic reasons, and so the alleged practical reasons for belief are the wrong kind of reasons for belief. But I argue in this paper that the evidentialists can still face a genuine dilemma between epistemic and practical rationality which cannot be resolved on the grounds that the alleged practical reasons for belief are the wrong kind of reasons for belief.
Epistemic rationality; practical rationality; evidentialism; the right kind of reasons; the wrong kind of reasons.
Author
Byeong D. Lee
Affiliation
Sungkyunkwan University
Address
Department of Philosophy, 25-2, Sungkyunkwan-ro, Jongno-gu, Seoul, Republic of Korea
Received
22 October 2022
Revised
29 May 2024
Accepted
31 May 2024
Publishers
Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences
Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Sciences
APA
Lee, B.D. (2024). An Epistemic-Practical Dilemma for Evidentialism. Organon F, 31(2), 95–113. https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2024.31201
Chicago
Lee, Byeong D. 2024. "An Epistemic-Practical Dilemma for Evidentialism." Organon F 31 (2): 95–113. https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2024.31201
Harvard
Lee, B.D. (2024). An Epistemic-Practical Dilemma for Evidentialism. Organon F, 31(2), pp. 95–113. https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2024.31201
© Byeong D. Lee
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