Organon F

Volume 29, November 2022, Issue 4, Pages 469–482

ISSN 2585-7150 (online) ISSN 1335-0668 (print)

Research Article

Testimonial Injustice and the Disquieting Conclusion: A Critique of the Critical Consciousness Requirement for Moral Culpability

Pamela Ann Boongaling

https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2022.29405

Abstract

In this paper, I will provide a critique of what I wish to call the “critical consciousness requirement” for moral culpability in Miranda Fricker’s theory of testimonial injustice. In my view, this requirement is stronger than our usual “epistemic requirement” for moral culpability. If this is so, it is more difficult to hold agents morally culpable for their actions using Fricker’s requirement. As I see it, this poses a significant threat to Fricker’s overall theory. One of the key claims that I make in this paper is that the combination of Fricker’s theory of testimonial injustice and her critical consciousness requirement for moral culpability leads to an undesirable outcome: a scenario where an injustice has been committed and yet nobody can be held morally responsible for it. This is problematic for this can be interpreted to mean that the combination mentioned above is committed to what I wish to call the “disquieting conclusion.” Generalizing on the undesirable outcome mentioned above, we can therefore say that some injustices, like the ones entertained by Fricker, are morally permissible. If I am correct, there is only one viable option for Fricker: She must drop the critical consciousness requirement and adopt the weaker epistemic requirement for moral culpability.

Keywords

Critical consciousness; disquieting conclusion; Miranda Fricker; quality of will; testimonial injustice.

Author(s) and affiliation(s)

Author

Pamela Ann Boongaling

Affiliation

University of the Philippines-Diliman

Address

University of the Philippines-Diliman.M339+HC2, Roxas Ave, Diliman, Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines

E-mail

pamelaannnjose@gmail.com 

About this article

Received

10 October 2021

Revised

22 November 2022

Accepted

15 December 2022

Publishers

Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences

Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Sciences

Cite as

APA

Boongaling, P.A. (2022). Testimonial Injustice and the Disquieting Conclusion: A Critique of the Critical Consciousness Requirement for Moral Culpability. Organon F29(4), 469–482. https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2022.29405

Chicago

Boongaling, Pamela Ann. 2022. "Testimonial Injustice and the Disquieting Conclusion: A Critique of the Critical Consciousness Requirement for Moral Culpability." Organon F 29 (4): 469–482. https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2022.29405

Harvard

Boongaling, P.A. (2022). Testimonial Injustice and the Disquieting Conclusion: A Critique of the Critical Consciousness Requirement for Moral Culpability. Organon F, 29(4), pp. 469–482. https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2022.29405

Copyright information

© Pamela Ann Boongaling

Response page

https://www.sav.sk/?lang=sk&doc=journal-list&part=article_response_page&journal_article_no=29389

The above URL is linked to the article's response page. The response page is a permanent location associated with the article's DOI number.


This article is distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International Public License (CC BY-NC 4.0).


Contact

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Slovak Academy of Sciences
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