Organon F

Volume 29, February 2022, Issue 1, Pages 47–77

ISSN 2585-7150 (online) ISSN 1335-0668 (print)

Research Article

A Causal-Mentalist View of Propositions

Jeremiah Joven B. Joaquin – James Franklin


In order to fulfil their essential roles as the bearers of truth and the relata of logical relations, propositions must be public and shareable. That requirement has favoured Platonist and other non-mental views of them, despite the well-known problems of Platonism in general. Views that propositions are mental entities have correspondingly fallen out of favour, as they have difficulty in explaining how propositions could have shareable, objective properties. We revive a mentalist view of propositions, inspired by Artificial Intelligence work on perceptual algorithms, which shows how perception causes persistent mental entities with shareable properties that allow them to fulfil the traditional roles of (one core kind of) propositions. The clustering algorithms implemented in perception produce outputs which are (implicit) atomic propositions in different minds. Coordination of them across minds proceeds by game-theoretic processes of communication. The account does not rely on any unexplained notions such as mental content, representation, or correspondence (although those notions are applicable in philosophical analysis of the result).


Propositions; causal-mentalist view; cluster analysis; game theory; perception algorithms; Platonism; symbol grounding.

Author(s) and affiliation(s)


Jeremiah Joven B. Joaquin


De La Salle University


Department of Philosophy, De La Salle University, 2401 Taft Avenue, Malate, Manila, Philippines 0922



James Franklin


University of New South Wales


School of Mathematics and Statistics, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia 2052


About this article


3 May 2020


20 September 2020


24 January 2021

Published online

23 March 2021


Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences

Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Sciences

Cite as


Joaquin, J.J.B. and Franklin, J. (2022). Partial Compatibilism: Free Will in the Light of Moral Experience. Organon F29(1), 47–77.


Joaquin, Jeremiah Joven B. and Franklin, James. 2022. "Partial Compatibilism: Free Will in the Light of Moral Experience." Organon F 29 (1): 47–77.


Joaquin, J.J.B. and Franklin, J. (2022). Partial Compatibilism: Free Will in the Light of Moral Experience. Organon F, 29(1), pp. 47–77.

Copyright information

© Jeremiah Joven B. Joaquin – James Franklin

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