Organon F
Volume 27, May 2020, Issue 2, Pages 263–279
ISSN 2585-7150 (online) ISSN 1335-0668 (print)
Research Article
Horwich on the Value of Truth
Byeong D. Lee
https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27204
On the normativity objection to Horwich’s minimalist theory of truth, his theory fails to capture the value of truth. In response to this objection, he argues that his minimalist theory of truth is compatible with the value of truth. On his view, the concept of truth is not constitutively normative, but the value of true beliefs can be explained instead by the belief-truth norm that we ought to want our beliefs to be true, and the value of true beliefs expressed in this norm is a moral value. I accept a deflationary theory of truth, according to which truth is too thin a concept to be constituted by any substantial norms. Thus I agree that the concept of truth is not constitutively normative. In this paper, however, I argue that the alleged value of true beliefs can be better explained in terms of epistemic normativity rather than moral normativity.
Horwich; deflationism about truth; the value of truth; moral values; epistemic values.
Author
Byeong D. Lee
Affiliation
Sungkyunkwan University
Address
Department of Philosophy, 25-2, Sungkyunkwan-ro, Jongno-gu, Seoul, Republic of Korea
Received
9 February 2019
Accepted
3 December 2019
Published online
13 December 2019
Publishers
Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences
Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Sciences
APA
Lee, Byeong D. (2020). Horwich on the Value of Truth. Organon F, 27(2), 263–279. https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27204
Chicago
Lee, Byeong D. 2020. "Horwich on the Value of Truth." Organon F 27 (2): 263–279. https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27204
Harvard
Lee, Byeong D. (2020). Horwich on the Value of Truth. Organon F, 27(2), pp. 263–279. https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27204
© Byeong D. Lee
https://www.sav.sk/index.php?lang=sk&doc=journal-list&part=article_response_page&journal_article_no=18358
The above URL is linked with the article's response page. The response page is a permanent location that is associated with the article's DOI number.
