Organon F

Volume 27, May 2020, Issue 2, Pages 169–186

ISSN 2585-7150 (online) ISSN 1335-0668 (print)

Research Article

In Defence of the Phenomenological Objection to Mental Fictionalism

Miklós Márton – János Tőzsér 


In this paper, we defend the main claims of our earlier paper “Mental Fictionalism as an Undermotivated Theory” (in The Monist) from Gábor Bács’s criticism, which appeared in his “Mental fictionalism and epiphenomenal qualia” (in Dialectica). In our earlier paper, we tried to show that mental fictionalism is an undermotivated theory, so there is no good reason to give up the realist approach to the folk psychological discourse. The core of Bács’s criticism consists in that our argumentation rests on an equivocation concerning the folk psychological concepts of conscious experiences. In our present argumentation, at first, we shortly recapitulate our earlier argumentation and Bács’s main objection to it. After that, we argue against the case of equivocation, claiming that it rests on a highly implausible and unsupported verificationist approach. Lastly, in answering another remark of Bács’s, we discuss the possibility of a realist mental fictionalism and conclude that it is an incoherent standpoint.


Mental fictionalism; folk psychology; mental antirealism; verificationism; conceptual dependence.

Author(s) and affiliation(s)


Miklós Márton (Corresponding Author)


Eötvös Loránd University Budapest


Center for Theory of Law and Society, Eötvös Loránd University Budapest, Bartók Béla str. 52/B, 2/2, Budapest, 1111, Hungary



János Tőzsér


Hungarian Academy of Sciences


Institute of Philosophy, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Ráday str. 26, Budapest, 1092 Hungary


About this article


4 May 2019


15 September 2019

Published online

13 December 2019


Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences

Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Sciences

Cite as


Márton, M. and Tőzsér, M. (2020). In Defence of the Phenomenological Objection to Mental Fictionalism. Organon F27(2), 169–186.


Márton, Miklós and Tőzsér, János. 2020. "In Defence of the Phenomenological Objection to Mental Fictionalism." Organon F 27 (2): 169–186.


Márton, M. and Tőzsér, M. (2020). In Defence of the Phenomenological Objection to Mental Fictionalism. Organon F, 27(2), pp. 169–186.

Copyright information

© Miklós Márton, János Tőzsér

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