Organon F
Volume 27, May 2020, Issue 2, Pages 169–186
ISSN 2585-7150 (online) ISSN 1335-0668 (print)
Research Article
In Defence of the Phenomenological Objection to Mental Fictionalism
Miklós Márton – János Tőzsér
https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27202
In this paper, we defend the main claims of our earlier paper “Mental Fictionalism as an Undermotivated Theory” (in The Monist) from Gábor Bács’s criticism, which appeared in his “Mental fictionalism and epiphenomenal qualia” (in Dialectica). In our earlier paper, we tried to show that mental fictionalism is an undermotivated theory, so there is no good reason to give up the realist approach to the folk psychological discourse. The core of Bács’s criticism consists in that our argumentation rests on an equivocation concerning the folk psychological concepts of conscious experiences. In our present argumentation, at first, we shortly recapitulate our earlier argumentation and Bács’s main objection to it. After that, we argue against the case of equivocation, claiming that it rests on a highly implausible and unsupported verificationist approach. Lastly, in answering another remark of Bács’s, we discuss the possibility of a realist mental fictionalism and conclude that it is an incoherent standpoint.
Mental fictionalism; folk psychology; mental antirealism; verificationism; conceptual dependence.
Author
Miklós Márton (Corresponding Author)
Affiliation
Eötvös Loránd University Budapest
Address
Center for Theory of Law and Society, Eötvös Loránd University Budapest, Bartók Béla str. 52/B, 2/2, Budapest, 1111, Hungary
Author
János Tőzsér
Affiliation
Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Address
Institute of Philosophy, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Ráday str. 26, Budapest, 1092 Hungary
Received
4 May 2019
Accepted
15 September 2019
Published online
13 December 2019
Publishers
Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences
Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Sciences
APA
Márton, M. and Tőzsér, M. (2020). In Defence of the Phenomenological Objection to Mental Fictionalism. Organon F, 27(2), 169–186. https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27202
Chicago
Márton, Miklós and Tőzsér, János. 2020. "In Defence of the Phenomenological Objection to Mental Fictionalism." Organon F 27 (2): 169–186. https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27202
Harvard
Márton, M. and Tőzsér, M. (2020). In Defence of the Phenomenological Objection to Mental Fictionalism. Organon F, 27(2), pp. 169–186. https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27202
© Miklós Márton, János Tőzsér
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