Organon F
Volume 26, February 2019, Issue 1, Pages 5–24
ISSN 2585-7150 (online) ISSN 1335-0668 (print)
Research Article | Special issue on Causality, Free Will, and Divine Action
The Many Inadequate Justifications of Methodological Naturalism
Robert A. Larmer
Contrary to proponents’ claims, methodological naturalism is not metaphysically neutral. Consequently, its acceptance as a practice requires justification. Unfortunately for its advocates, attempts to justify it are failures. It cannot be defended as a definition, or a self-imposed limitation, of science, nor, more modestly, as an inductively justified commitment to natural causes. As a practice, it functions not to further scientific investigation, but rather to impose an explanatory straitjacket.
Ad hominem fallacy; nomological science; historical science; supernatural agency; inductive generalization; Robert Pennock.
Author
Robert A. Larmer
Affiliation
University of New Brunswick
Address
Department of Philosophy, University of New Brunswick, 19 Macaulay Lane, Carleton Hall 211, Fredericton NB, E3B 5A3, Canada
Received
24 May 2018
Accepted
4 September 2018
Published online
22 January 2019
Publishers
Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences
Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy of Sciences
APA
Larmer, R. A. (2019). The Many Inadequate Justifications of Methodological Naturalism. Organon F, 26(1), 5–24. https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2019.26102
Chicago
Larmer, Robert A. 2019. "The Many Inadequate Justifications of Methodological Naturalism." Organon F 26 (1): 5–24. https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2019.26102
Harvard
Larmer, R. A. (2019). The Many Inadequate Justifications of Methodological Naturalism. Organon F, 26(1), pp. 5–24. https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2019.26102
© Robert A. Larmer
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