

Response to Kosterec

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Miloš Kosterec raised four objections against the analysis of fictional names proposed in my paper on fictional names (see [Kosterec 2018] and [Glavaničová 2017], respectively). The paper was devoted to two analyses of fictional names within Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL). The former was the analysis actually proposed by the founder of TIL Pavel Tichý in his “green bible,” *The Foundations of Frege’s Logic*. Tichý analysed fictional names in terms of free variables. This analysis was briefly explained and assessed in the paper. The latter analysis was my own, in its very first version. This second analysis made use of Tichý’s notion of individual roles (offices, things-to-be). I reminded the reader of the affinity of this analysis to the account of fictional names known as *role realism*.¹

Kosterec in his discussion of my paper rightly observes that there is some tension between roles as understood in TIL and roles as understood in my paper. While the former is a functional, intensional object, the latter is much closer to an individual concept, which is a hyperintensional object, or to the

¹ The most prominent advocates of this position are Wolterstorff (1980), Currie (1990), Lamarque and Olsen (1994) and Lamarque (2009; 2010). Arguably, a version of role realism was also formulated in (Tiedke 2011).

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hyperintensional analysis of (im)possible individuals suggested by Cmorej (2015a, 2015b).²

This paper explains the main objection formulated by Kosterec and shows some preliminary evidence in my defence (Section 1). Subsequently, a clarification is made, providing necessary means for responding to Kosterec’s worry (Section 2). Subsequently, my analysis in its current state is briefly explained (Section 3). Finally, the paper responds to the main objection formulated by Kosterec (Section 4). As further worries and challenges largely depend on the main objection, I will postpone the response to these other objections until the main objection is thoroughly discussed.

1. The main objection

The main objection formulated by Kosterec was as follows: In TIL, there is only one necessarily empty individual role. As the fictional names are analysed in terms of necessarily empty roles, the very same object is assigned to all fictional names.

I acknowledge that this is true if the notion of roles is precisely the same as the one used in TIL. Yet the reader was reminded several times that this is clearly not so (though, granted, the provided analysis was just a preliminary one). To begin with, I differentiated between hyperintensional, intensional, and extensional occurrences of fictional names (Glavaničová 2017, 397). Moreover, I stated clearly that the proposal requires such a notion of roles that allows for different (constructions of) necessarily empty roles (Glavaničová 2017, 398 and 399).

Above I have said that the employed notion is “much closer” to individual concepts, but haven’t said it was “identical.” This has been no accident! The upshot is that there are at least two ways how to individuate roles to avoid the problem of ending up with just one necessarily empty role. One of them is employing the notion of hyperoffice, the other is to individuate

² Some challenges were raised in (Kofátko 2017). A brief suggestion to extend Cmorej’s approach to fictional entities can be found in (Zouhar 2017, 134, footnote 3).

roles also in terms of their requisites. However, it needs to be said that the former option seems to be much more plausible if we find ourselves within the framework of TIL, the latter seems to be more plausible if the notion of roles as used in role realism is employed. For roles of role realism can be understood (with possible further corrections, amendments and clarifications) as sets of requisites.

2. The clarification: roles

To keep the matters precise, let me make some clarifications. In the paper under the discussion, I oscillated between three readings of the term role:

- (i) role understood as an intensional object within the TIL hierarchy: a function from possible worlds (and times) to individuals—this is the notion of roles (or offices) as used in TIL community; and this is the notion of roles Kosterec rightly worries I have in mind when speaking about fictional characters;
- (ii) role as construed by role realism, which amounts to a requisite set in TIL— roles in this sense can be understood as sets of essential properties of fictional characters; note, however, that a precise specification of which properties fall into this heading and which do not is not an easy task even in particular cases— and probably is not even a task for a semanticist, but a task for a literary critic; a general procedure for generating these properties is not easier than a procedure for generating truth(s) in fiction; and
- (iii) individual concept, a hyperintension (TIL construction) constructing an intensional role.

From now on I will use the term *individual role* for (i), the term *role* for (ii), and the term *individual concept* for (iii).

3. My analysis: the present state

While the paper under discussion contained only some basic ideas of my future account, my chapter (Glavaničová 2018) presents the analysis more clearly, with the focus to the class of standard problems in the area and ways how to account for them. Yet both (Glavaničová 2017) and (Glavaničová 2018) were rather informal, and both oscillated between roles in three different senses explained above.

The proposal in its current, more elaborated state, can be summed up as follows: There are fictional names *de dicto* and fictional names *de re*. *De dicto* analysis of fictional names is a form of hyperintensional role realism. The sense of a fictional name is an individual concept (a hyperintension) associated with a set of requisites. The requisite set is basically the same thing as a role of role realism (for instance, *being a detective* is a requisite of Sherlock Holmes; *being an unhappily married woman* is a requisite of Thérèse Raquin). While the sense is an abstract entity, the reference, if any, is a concrete person. However, while the sense exists, the reference does not. Moreover, there is (necessarily!) no reference, no full-blooded Sherlock Holmes.³

One can formulate two semi-formal analyses within the above setting. The first one is a TIL-friendly analysis. This analysis distinguishes hyperintensional, intensional and extensional occurrences of fictional names.

The second analysis is a simplification of the first analysis that partially departs from standard TIL analyses. The second analysis distinguishes *de dicto* (hyperintensional) and *de re* (extensional) occurrences only. One level disappears, which means that the work done on this level had to be moved “upwards” (hyperintensionality) or “downwards” (extensionality). My suggestion is to move upwards. The work previously done by intensions is thus done by hyperintensions.

³ A similar suggestion (fictional characters being impossible) was made in (Vacek 2018). See also (Vacek 2017) for the framework employed.

4. The response

Now on either of the two analyses explained in the previous section, the Kosterec's worry does not arise. For the individual concept pertaining to the name *Holmes* is different from the individual concept pertaining to *Watson*. I am an individual numerically different from Miloš Kosterec. Similarly, Holmes-concept is numerically different from Watson-concept. Now this distinctness might have different reasons. Probably the best explanation is that the Holmes-concept is joined with a different set of requisites than the Watson-concept. In this way, a crucial usage of roles is made.

Yet at least one worry remains. The notion of requisites was formulated only for things that are at least possible. However, I can reveal that the first attempts to overcome this limitation have been made within the TIL community. Yet still a lot of work remains to be done till we arrive at a hyperintensional notion of requisites which would be sufficient for generating requisites of fictional characters.

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